565 any one family seldom remained constant for more than two or three generations. These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There are definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy.

B. Social Mobility

565 428 596 The family ideal. Large families, especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[4] However, in practice, the ideal was limited by economic means. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions, individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families and particularly when land was the sole source of income.[5] On the

4. Consult chapter on Family in this handbook.

5. "In the matter of inheritance, the general pattern observed for poor agriculturalists holds very well for the merchant group. Just as at the death of a farmer, there is a sharing of the property. In the agricultural situation, however, there seems to be greater fragmentation of the legacy, each son working his share more or less independently and with a minimum of combination. In the merchant situation there is somewhat more cohesion among heirs, who often work the inherited enterprise as partners." Morton H. Fried, Fabric of Chinese Society, New York, Praeger, 1953, p. 52.

565 other hand, because of the existence of extended
596 families and the clan structure, less fortunate
428 members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

183 The scholar ideal. Learning was much es-
565 teemed, especially when combined with wealth.
555 The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indicative of the respect all Chinese had for learning was the popular saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[6] The emphasis

6. This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China, Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be oversimple, it indicates that the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected
[continued next page]

668
590 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute
668 for the traditional social structure. Since the
555 individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement makes conformity the criteria of success. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the Classics and their

THE FAMILY - SOUTHWEST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

• 596 Until almost the end of the imperial period (221 B.C. to A.D. 1912), the family was a vital and universal aspect of the centralized state in China and most characteristic of the society which sustained it. Since then, the family has been in flux. The direction of change and the major causes and problem involved will be sketched in this section. A more precise picture, as Marion Levy has pointed out, is not feasible with the existing incomplete state of material on Chinese society both before and since the inauguration of the Communist regime.[1]

The traditional family still persists. It proved resistant, but not impregnable, to the influx of modern Western techniques and ideas after 1842 and to the political revolutionary efforts to realize democracy and equality in the present century. The traditional family is still proving tenacious, in the face of the Communist regime's persistent effort to turn Chinese society inside out.

To understand the nature of the Chinese family today, it is necessary first to take account

1. Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 273.

596 of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in Southwest China.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

594 596 565 183 The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant class. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

2. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

3. Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

B. Social Role

596 562 769 The principal social function of the family in China was the bearing, rearing, and training of children. Sons were more highly valued than daughters, becuase only the former remained with the family after marriage, contributing to its labor and income, and only sons could perpetuate the family and perform the yearly rites in honor of the father and the family ancestors after the father's death. Implicit in the ceremony was the idea that the ancestors had a life afte death, watched over the family's fortune, and were comforted by the periodic ministrations of the family. For the living, the rites provided an occasion for awe and respect during which the continuity of the family over time was reemphasized and the solidarity and duties of the family unit in the present reasserted.

The veneration of ancestors was so important to Chinese society that the absence of sons to carry on the yearly observances was regarded as a major failing on the responsible male's part and a tremendous catastrope for the family. Concubinage and adoption were socially and legally sanctioned as means of providingsons, if marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide.

554 561 596 Just as sex, age, and generation determined an individual's status within the family, so did

561 these factors determine his behavior and position
554 in the community and the world at large. An
596 additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society.

562 Authority and dominance were the province
554 of the males. Women might, and occasionally did, exervise overt leadership. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however. In modern times, at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed.

561 Age was honored relatively and absolute-
554 ly. Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China, age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis.

555 Individual status also improved with ed-
596 ucation, more particularly with the attainment
554 of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official careeer was usually dependent on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the exams was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and

555 554 596 village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

577 596 642 To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

618 Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaing peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It bound together families with a common ancestor to promote their security and advancement. Relying for strength on the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties, the tsu reinforced the authority of the family head and the values he imparted to the younger generation. The tsu settled disputes between families, conducted ancestor rites for

631 As it was constituted under the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912) and again in the 1930's by the National Government, ten adjacent families were grouped as a p'ai, ten p'ai as a chia, and ten chia, or one thousand households, as a pao. The head of each unit was responsible for the conduct and defense of those households under him, and the head of the pao had to answer to the government for the conduct and protection of the thousand households.

D. Economic Role

•596 421 As the definition of the term "family" infers, it was the basic economic unit of the society. Real property such as land, houses, and workshops were owned by the family rather than by individuals. When disharmony caused the breakup of a joint family, its real property was divided among the constituent conjugal families, each as a new family claiming title to the portion of property which fell to its share.

596 The peasant, artisan, and small-merchant families were units of both production and consumption. Male family members worked together in the fields, workshop, or store to produce the goods on which the family mainly relied for a living. Sons nearly always followed their father's [462] occupation and seldom left home. Women worked in the home, taking care of the children and turning out the family's clothes and shoes. Where sericulture was practiced, women managed the entire industry from the cultivation of mulberry trees to the weaving of cloth. Food and clothing

596 were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

Some variation from this pattern occurred among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

The family and its extensions in China also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or desrving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business systems in the twentieth century.

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

596 178 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately

596 178 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those cities. The same influences also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

596 491 198 361 Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China.

178 For one thing, it organized economic activity on
361 a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas
471 attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn
596 an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subject to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficiency operation of modern production and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possesion of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprise in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

871 In many places where the Chinese popula-
178 tion was sheltered from direct contact with
596 modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteeth and twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and

871 offered to a broader segment of the population in
178 the decade before World War II. New social,
596 political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press.
489 Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or
596 more away from the nearest great city were
178 brought only hours away by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and way of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

668 An even more disturbing influence on the
178 old way of life was the increasing spread of revo-
596 lutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student of anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially concious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

596 178 In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was undermined. He was still needed at home to carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

369 596 178 562 The family in the rural areas adjacent to industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship

continued to give a greater primacy to males in the family, but the ability of daughters to earn a wage enhanced their value to the family and made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, however, that women of farming and laboring families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children. Having a higher education, the younger members of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right to individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16
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178 While modern education gave youth increased stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in high school were willing to answer the question as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal,: acting "against the trend of the time"; as "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium and frequenting brotherls Mothers were more gently and less often criticized but they were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society

6. Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

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178 has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by foreign firms or government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successsively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911.

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7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

178 596 No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

596 671 582 In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater immediate success.[9]

Eassentially, the outward provisions of the Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

(1)...The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.

(2)...The abolition of the feudal system

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8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, Aug.1955, pp.515-32.

[9. and 10. next page]

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of marriage...based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect...of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.

(3)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

In propagandizing and implementing the Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriage, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

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To help traditionally-minded families

9. See comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as C.B.: Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

10. See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, p. 3.

11. "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

attain the new Communist-established goal of "democracy" and "harmony." Family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure, condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in their children's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage." [12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese society with two utilitarian purposes in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed. For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphasis on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices from them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and...the interests of the people

12. [see next page]

596 should be the highest criterion governing our
668 actions toward our parents." [13]

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

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596 As the Nationalist government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to this great majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not

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12. See especially C.B., 273, pp.1-3; pp.4-14 and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong American Consulate, 932, iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 8.

13. SCMP, 973, p. 31.

14. Ibid., 106, p. 15.

15. See, for instance, C.B., p. 4; and SCMP, 104 pp. 30-31.

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encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

The result was apathy, when not open resistance, toward the reorientation of marriage and family practices among the farming population. These attitudes were as typical of most of the village cadres as of the rural people generally.[16] However, Liu Ching-fan's criticism in 1953 of the use of force by village cadres to achieve acceptance of the new Marriage Law's provisions indicates that up to that time violence accompanied this measure as it had other measures in Communist China.[17]

The regime became aware only slowly of the failure of the Marriage Law to take automatic effect. A preliminary investigation gave such cause for concern that a thorough investigation was made at the end of 1952.[18] The results impelled the Communists to launch a drive

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16. See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

17. C.B., 273, p. 4.

18. See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

596 671 for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and intensive indoctrination of the people in its principles. The movement was restricted to Han Chinese areas where land reform had been completed.[19]

Summing up the result of the campaign before the Government Administrative Council on November 11, 1953, Liu Ching-fan reported satisfactory indoctrination of 80 to 90 per cent of the adults in 15 per cent of the nation's hsien and municipalities where land reform had been completed and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 60 to 70 per cent of the people in 60 per cent of similar local areas. Almost no progress was indicated in the remaining 25 per cent of the localities.[20] Assuming the population in these areas to be roughly equal, these figures would mean that on an over-all basis even partial success was claimed for only 48 to 55.5 per cent of the population subjected to the indoctrination process.

596 671 582 C. The Communists' Vague Picture of Success

Unfortunately, we cannot precisely judge how successful the regime has been in implementing the Marriage Law nationally or regionally. Communist evaluations are too generalized to reveal a definite picture, and statistics released by the regime are sketchy and, when available, rarely provide a basis for significant comparison. Reports on the results of the 1952

19. C.B., 273, p. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 3.

investigations of Marriage Law implementation were evidently intended to illustrate the extremes of backwardness and progress in family practices rather than to give a comprehensive picture of them. A spate of press accounts in January 1952 referred to conditions from good to bad found in political units of varying size throughout the country, but none of the accounts contained references to the Southwest Region. Evidently, the regime encountered more difficulties here than elsewhere. Last of the regions to fall to the Communists and to complete land reform, the Southwest was still reporting difficulties in expanding the Party organization in the region and complaining of the lack of education and soundness in existing cadres as late as January 1954.[21]

The Communist press announced in October 1951 that all areas in the Southwest Region had begun a check-up on Marriage Law implementation, but noted that one of the duties of the work teams involved in the task was to educate local cadres. The report also referred to a meeting of government organs in Sikang to correct the "erroneous ideas" of some cadres that to publish the Marriage Law "would cause confusion" in the central work of the Party.[22]

Some light was shed on the situation in the Southwest Region by a Communist article written in the fall of 1953. Referring to "the

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21. SCMP, 858, Supplement, vii-xii; 970, pp. 29-32.

22. Ibid., 198.

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stubborn remnants of the old marriage system... still damaging the prosperity, security, and happiness of the people of New China," the article cited the example of the subdistrict of Chen-yu in Szechwan. According to the article, there had been no strong "progressive" influence in the area before "liberation," and the Marriage Law team found family relations little changed from the traditional pattern. To propagandaize and implement the new Marriage Law in the subdistrict, the team undertook the training of new cadres made up of village administrators, leaders of peasant women's associations, and members of the Communist Party and New Democratic Youth Corps. It soon turned out that "at least half [the new cadres] were themselves influenced by feudal ideas." Further troubles were encountered when an attempt at a panel discussion to illustrate the need for reform by soliciting personal experiences ended in failure. In carrying the movement to the people, the method of assembling individual families and encouraging wives to reveal abusive treatment by husbands and mothers-in-law had to be called off because 23 the sessions only succeeded in developing quarrels. This revelation of the resistance to family reorientation in the Southwest Region has no parallel insofar as is known, although similar problems were undoubtedly encountered outside the Southwest Region.

The latest report on the reorganization of family life in China was given in March 1955 by the Marriage Law Implementing Committee.

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23. Fang Yen, "Making the Marriage Law Work," China Reconstructs, Peking, Sept.-Oct. 1953, pp. 32-33.

596 671 582 Couched in general terms, the announcement gave no clear indication of the true situation in the country or any one of its regions. For example, the committee reported on the prevalence of free marriages during the first quarter of 1954, stating that of the 402,025 applications for marriage registration in 562 hsien and municipalities of 15 provinces only 1.07 per cent were denied because the contemplated marriages had been arranged without the consent of the couples concerned.[24] No figures were released on the remaining, roughly three-quarters of the country's hsien and municipalities, nor was any indication given to show whether the figures cited were typical of the whole country, the only figures available, or figures selected for propaganda or other purposes. If the figures can be given credence, they indicate a remarkable advance over the situation existing two years earlier. After an investigation of Marriage Law implementation in 1952, a woman minister of justice, Shih Liang, reported that in only three of the country's 2,086 counties were families reformed "up to perfect Communist standards," and that in the East and Central-South regions freely contracted marriages and other reforms had gained no acceptance with the people.[25]

The Marriage Law Implementing Committee's report in March 1955 also included a summary of conditions "in certain advanced areas in Shansi and elsewhere." It is unlikely that any of the "advanced areas elsewhere" were

24. SCMP, 1002, p. 3.

25. China News Analysis, Hong Kong, No. 5, p. 2.

596 671 582 in the Southwest Region. Far more likely, the region would have been mentioned in reports on the areas "least progressive" in family reform, had the Communists cared to publicize such conditions in 1955. But the report on the "advanced areas" gives some indication of the best the Communists have been able to do in places where they have been long estabished. According to the commitee, family relationships were improved or improving in 90 to 95 per cent of the homes and "bad" in only 5 to 10 per cent. Of the larger group, 10 to 15 per cent were described as the "advanced modern type...with a definite degree of socialist consciousness, where democracy and harmony obtain and members are united for production." The commitee announcement added that in 80 per cent of these homes women were no longer oppressed, beaten, or scolded, but "remnants of the patriarchal system and the conception of the rights of the husband" still existed to varying degrees.[26]

C. Reorientation of Family Reform

596 183 No rapid change in traditional family attitudes and practices in the Southwest Region is likely to have occurred to date. The all-out effort to revolutionize the Chinese family in the spring of 1953 has not been repeated. Soon after the 1953 campaign, decreasing emphasis was given by the regime to quick implementation of the new Marriage Law. Family reform was made a continuing part of the everyday work of the various

26. SCMP, 1002, p. 3.

Party and state organizations. The complaint of the Party since then has been that the cadres are not taking the work seriously.[27]

There are indications that by 1953 the regime's emphasis on new freedom for women and the prominent publicity given statistics on divorce had led to the Marriage Law being popularly termed the "Divorce Law."[28] At the same time, resistance in the rural areas to sudden changes in the old institutions of marriage and family relations are becoming evident to Party leaders as the results of the late 1952 investigations are tabulated.

A shift in pace and in the propaganda emphasis on marriage and family reform was evident in Liu Ching-fan's report to the Government Administration Council at the end of 1953. Although the better treatment and greater freedom given to women were not to be neglected, greater emphasis was placed on the establishment of "harmonious" and "democratic" relationships within the family, whether originally of the old or new type, and to the positive benefits that would accrue to all members of the family as a consequence of reform.[29]

Analyzing the then current situation, Liu noted that the people still maintained a feudal ideology and consciousness in regard to many social problems, and that this attitude in respect to marriage problems was a "more universal

27. Ibid., p. 4.
28. China News Analysis, No. 5, p.2.
29. C.B., 273, pp. 5-6.

596 185 and serious one." Liu admitted that the abolition of the feudal marriage system and the establishment of the new system was "a long term and difficult process in the ideological and social reform of the people." To accomplish this reform, he added, the regime would have to co-ordinate its efforts with the people's personal interests and levels of attainment, persuade the people patiently, and raise their level steadily. The process of implementing the Marriage Law, Liu concluded, would have to be made part of the regular tasks of the government and people's organizations at all levels and co-ordinated with the central tasks of production, construction and elections.[30] These recommendations have become the principles by which the government still seems to be guided in marriage and family reform.

596 185 369 In the cities where modern influence had prepared the people for acceptance of new marriage and family principles, the regime encountered a different kind of problem. Just before International Women's Day, March 8, 1955, an authoritative statement in the Communist press added a new note to the usual reference to lingering remnants of feudal obstruction and the long-term nature of family reform. The statement charged that bourgeois ideology had reached into marriage and family relationships. The bourgeois influences detected were love of luxury and disparagement of labor, "carelessness" in choosing marriage partners or the desire for new partners after marriage

30. Ibid., pp. 4-6.

• 596 185 369 and devotion to self- interest. They had respectively given rise to the sins of marriage based on money, "the belittlement of sexual relationships," and maltreatment, desertion, and irresponsibility toward parents and children.[31]

The nation's young people were evidently the most prone to this subversive influence. A campaign to guard youth against "bourgeois concepts" was launched in the large cities during the spring of 1955. In connection with the drive, the Communist press evidenced concern regarding romantic love, heart-break, unsolved marriage problems of workers in sparsely populated areas, and the attractions and diversions of a carefree social life in the cities. These things, the press warned, were subverting many young people from their primary duty of devoting their whole effort and attention to study and work in the national interest. The advice of the Communist editors, "to place love in a secondary position in one's life," is hardly likely to solve the problem.[32]

A different sort of problem confronted youth in the countryside. Apparently the possibility was not present there for youth to develop love and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts... the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking.

31. SCMP, 1022, p. 4.

32. Ibid., pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.

596 As a result, "most marriages are still being
185 contracted after both parties were first intro-
369 duced to each other by third parties." The report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[33]

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic and Political Role

596 A second step taken by the Communist
575 regime to change radically the nature and function
467 of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social, political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform. Until it was completed in any area, no alternate organization to the family existed to assume its [582] socio-economic role. This fact seem to explain why the Communists during the spring of 1953 limited their Marriage Law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished.

596 Special organizations were set up to train
575 and absorb the energies of women and children
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33. Ibid., 1002, p. 3.

596 who might otherwise be free of the constant
575 direct influence of the government. These two
562 groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Democratic Women's Federation and into the Young Pioneers, the Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

596 Aside from its primary role as a unit
861 for procreation and for child-care until the young reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state training process. An editorial in the People's Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solicitude" of the government toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that the trade unions were to help office employees and workers to learn how to educate their children: Teachers and directors of the Young Pioneers were to assume the "important responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[34]

596 With the Communist regime's emphases
593 on youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents need clarification. An

34. Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

596 article on the subject in the January 1955 issue
593 of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution." If the parents are counterrevolutionaries, they should not be respected but treated as enemies; if they are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to reform-through-labor, and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burden will fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[35]

563 Except for the Chengtu Plain, an ancient
596 center of Chinese civilization and population in Szechwan, the Southwest Region is occupied largely by Chinese who immigrated since the fourteen century. About twenty per cent of the region's population consists of various indigenous tribes scattered throughout the more mountainous areas and following different social and family customs

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35. Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.

563 596 too various to describe in this chapter.[36] Under the Communists, the tribal peoples have been given special treatment, and the uniqueness of 37 their social systems has been largely preserved. No attempt was made to implement the new Marriage Law in the ethnic minority autonomous areas established by the new regime.

178 In the twentieth century, family patterns among the Chinese people of the Southwest Region have largely followed the forms of traditional China before the beginning of industrialization and the resulting outgrowth of revolutionary social and political forces.[38] The customs and practices of the Chinese people long established on the Cheng-tu Plain and of immigrants, mostly from the Yangtze River provinces of the Central-South and East China regions, were little disturbed by modern trends until the capital of the Nationalist Government was moved to Chungking during the war with Japan. Previously, Western-style commerce and industry had made little progress in the region, the intrusion of modern trends from other parts of China had been barred by the lack of railway and highway links with the outside world, and warlord rule had perpetuated traditional values and practices. One significant modern influence that had made its way into the region was modern education at the universities, especially in the

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36. The chapter on Ethnic Groups describes some of the major social characteristics of the principal indigenous tribes.

37. See Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "Minority Groups in Kweichow Province," C.B., 150, pp.8-15.

38. On the family in the Southwest Region, see Francis L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality, New York, Columbia U. Press, 1948; and Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China's [cont'd]

577 The son was to submit unquestioningly to his father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family.

573 643 In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrates of the imperial bureaucracy were often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People." To reciprocate the care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[49]

• 596 597 The individual was subject. His personality was

49. The Classic of Filial Piety says: "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balazs, Le Traite Juridique du Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

formed within the family; his status in society was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system -- particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was held responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned and the individual's life and character were formed by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[50]

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

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50. Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.

596 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

572 The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

181 572 596 The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

181 178 When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family

51. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

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[redacted]

system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

596 181 668 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- sometimes denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

572 668 "Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

576 668 643 The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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53. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p.325.

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The great leader is like a father,
Mao Tse-tung educates us....[54]

Another praises his paternal care for his people

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

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As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as

54. From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

55. From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs], Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

56. From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

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"a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says:

Our great fatherland-
We should pay it the same filial
reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

57. Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao[People's Pictorial] Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

58. In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng[Yantze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

59. Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

60. The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has the baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

181 668 596 one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern

[61. and 62. on following page]

181 associated with the old image of brotherhood
668 and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly
596 subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

577 In traditional China, "face" meant one's
668 moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu). One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the rôle which society

61. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counterrevolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies.

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, op.cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp. 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.